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Legislators, bureaucrats and locational decisions and beyond

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  1. University of Maryland, USA

    Joe A. Oppenheimer

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  1. Joe A. Oppenheimer
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Oppenheimer, J.A. Legislators, bureaucrats and locational decisions and beyond. Public Choice 37, 133–140 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124236

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