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Regulation, redistribution, and public choice

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Emory University, Atlanta, USA

    Peter H. Aranson

  2. Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA

    Peter C. Ordeshook

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  1. Peter H. Aranson
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Aranson, P.H., Ordeshook, P.C. Regulation, redistribution, and public choice. Public Choice 37, 69–100 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124233

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