Concluding Remarks
The Brito and Intriligator paper is an ambitious and provocative piece of work. The lack of a satisfactory theoretical model of the interactions between the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the bureaucratic apparatus is one of the major shortcomings of modern political economy. In general, efforts by political theorists to remedy this deficiency should be encouraged. The present authors, in particular, should be encouraged to continue their line of research, refining and further developing their political model, while applying it to other important policy areas.
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Support of the National Science Foundation under Grant SOC79-08561 is gratefully acknowledged. The author is Professor of Economics and Research Associate, Center for Study of Public Choice, Blacksburg, Virginia, 24061.
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Mackay, R.J. Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology. Public Choice 37, 61–68 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124232
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124232