Abstract
Treaties to limit strategic arms, such as those resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), are generally viewed as resulting in a reduced level of military spending and an increased level of security for both countries. This paper shows that such treaties generally would accelerate the qualitative arms race and could lead to the introduction of new and potentially destabilizing weapon systems. Thus, the result might be an increase in military spending and a decrease in the level of security for both countries. This result is supported by a formal model of bureaucratic decision making, in which defense bureaus choose between purchases of existing weapons systems or research and development expenditures on new weapons systems. The formal model leads to two theorems which identify the conditions under which arms limitation treaties lead to innovations in weapons technology and to increased military spending.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Brito, D.L. (1972) A Dynamic Model of an Armaments Race. International Economic Review, 13: 359–75.
Brito, D.L. and Intriligator, M.D. (1977) A Fixed Point Approach to Multiagent Adaptive Control. Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 6: 137–45.
— and — (1980) A Game-Theoretic Approach to Bureaucratic Behavior. Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics. ed. P.T. Liu. New York and London: Plenum Press.
Gawthrop, L.C. (1969) Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch. New York: Free Press.
Huntington, S.P. (1958) Arms Races: Prerequirements and Results. Public Policy. eds. C.J. Friedrich and S.E. Harris. Cambridge: Harvard University.
Intriligator, M.D. and Brito, D.L. (1976) Formal Models of Arms Races. Journal of Peace Science, 2: 77–88.
Kissinger, H. (1979) Interview. The Economist, February 3, 1979.
Mackay, R. and Weaver, C. (1978c) Agenda Control by Budget Maximizers in a Multi-Bureau Setting. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, mimeo.
Niskanen, W.A., Jr. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
— (1973) Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1978) Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agenda, and the Status Quo. Public Choice, 33: 27–44.
— and — (1979) Bureaucrats vs. Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93: 563–87.
Samuelson, P.A. (1947) Foundation of Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Silberberg, E. (1978) The Structure of Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Tullock, G. (1965) The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
Wildavsky, A. (1964) The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Boston: Little Brown and Company.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Support of the National Science Foundation, in the form of collaborative research grants on “Behavioral and Economic Foundation of Arms Races,” is gratefully acknowledged.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Brito, D.L., Intriligator, M.D. Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology. Public Choice 37, 41–59 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124231
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124231