Abstract
This paper explores the distinction between processes of decision making and their outcomes in the context of the individualistic constitutional calculus. The motivation is primarily methodological. A taxonomy and analytic framework are suggested which explicitly recognize the possible motivations of the constitution setter, and which allow decision making processes to be viewed as both means and ends. The framework is utilized to provide a critical review of some aspects of the received literature.
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Based on work contained in Hamlin (1981). Thanks are due to Profesors Wiseman, Sen, Buchanan, and Tullock and to an anonymous referee.
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Hamlin, A.P. Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes. Public Choice 42, 133–145 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124156
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124156