Abstract
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the factors affecting bribe taking by public officials. Factors influencing the acceptance of bribes include: the probability of being convicted, severity of punishment, government salary relative to private sector income, the demonstration effect, and the unemployment rate. Our results indicate that higher probability of being convicted discourages the acceptance of bribes as does more severe punishment. Low relative earnings, high unemployment, and the demonstration effect of aggregate advertising all lead to increased bribe taking.
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The authors are solely responsible for the views expressed and any remaining errors. Oak Ridge National Laboratory does not necessarily support our conclusions.
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Goel, R.K., Rich, D.P. On the economic incentives for taking bribes. Public Choice 61, 269–275 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123889
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123889