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An instrumental-variables approach to income redistribution

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Abstract

When individuals participate in the process that determines their own redistributive obligations and claims, biased outcomes can be expected. This bias can be substantially eliminated by partitioning the collectivity into groups that set one another's redistributive obligations in a cycle.

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Tideman, T.N., Coats, R.M. An instrumental-variables approach to income redistribution. Public Choice 52, 187–192 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123876

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123876

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