Abstract
In some circumstances, politicians set about altering the composition of their electorate with a view to increasing their chances of being re-elected. A hypothesis along these lines is formulated in the context of local elections and residential mobility. Although the hypothesis is general, an assessment of its validity implies auxiliary assumptions related to a specific spatio-temporal context. That is done with reference to conditions prevailing in post-war French metropolitan areas. In the empirical part of the paper, some of the implications are submitted to tests on demographical and political data. On the basis of the tests, and although alternative explanations of the findings are possible, the hypothesis can be said to be corroborated.
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Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1986 Meeting of the European Public Choice Society and at the 1986 Journées de Microéconomie Appliquée. We are grateful for the comments and suggestions made on these occasions or independently by Jean Bénard, Albert Breton, Giorgio Brosio, Gérard Charreaux, Louis Duquesne de la Vinelle, Gianluigi Galeotti, François Gardes, Roger Guesnerie, Jean-Dominique Lafay, Claude Meidinger, Bernard Nonat, Werner Pommerehne, Alain Wolfelsperger, and an anonymous referee. Any remaining errors and shortcomings are our sole responsibility. We also thank the Institut de Mathématiques Appliquées for research support.
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Mingat, A., Salmon, P. Alterable electorates in the context of residential mobility. Public Choice 59, 67–82 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00119450
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00119450