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Progressive reform as induced institutional preferences

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  1. Michigan State University, USA

    Gary J. Miller

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  1. Gary J. Miller
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Miller, G.J. Progressive reform as induced institutional preferences. Public Choice 47, 163–181 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00119356

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