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Multi-candidate equilibria

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Abstract

We demonstrate the existence of an electoral equilibrium in a model with three or more candidates. We use the same kinds of assumptions that have previously been used to establish existence in two-candidate models and have not had to make special assumptions regarding dimensionality (e.g., that there is only one dimension) or distribution of voter preferences (e.g., symmetry).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Merrill College, University of California, 95064, Santa Cruz, CA

    Donald Wittman

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  1. Donald Wittman
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Wittman, D. Multi-candidate equilibria. Public Choice 43, 287–291 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118937

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118937

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