Abstract
Explaining the existence and stability of democracies pose difficulties for the Public Choice-paradigm. The article argues that these difficulties may be resolved by focusing on the insurance-aspect of democratic decision-making procedures. Democratic regimes may be better able than autocratic regimes to provide the inhabitants with insurance against the risk of being subjected to arbitrary suppression from the ruling elite. This propensity of democratic regimes may explain the origin, as well as stability, of such regimes.
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Thanks to Bard-Anders Andreassen, Erling Barth and an anonymous referee for valuable comments to an earlier draft.
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Overbye, E. Democracy as insurance. Public Choice 87, 319–345 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118652
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118652