Abstract
The objective of this paper is to investigate by means of simulation the impact of third-party entry on the spatial separation of candidates. Specifically, we do real-time simulations of Palfrey's (1984) model of electoral equilibria with entry after relaxing some of its assumptions. Our finding that the threat of third-party entry can induce virtually the same spatial separation of the major-party candidates as entry with certainty is both a strong and interesting result.
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Bender, B., Haas, T.C. Electoral equilibria with entry: Some simulations. Public Choice 87, 303–314 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118650
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118650