Abstract
As federal government expenditures have grown, there has been an increasing awareness of the distribution of taxes and expenditures across states. States in the Northeast have claimed that sunbelt states have been getting more than their fair share of federal spending, with the sunbelt states denying the charge. A theory of political coalitions is developed to explain why the sunbelt should be unable to receive differentially high expenditures, although the sunbelt may pay less than a proportional amount in taxes because of its relatively low income. An empirical test shows that the data are in agreement with this theory.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Break, G. F. (1980). Financing government in a federal system. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann. Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Holcombe, R. G., and Zardkoohi, A. (1981). The determinants of federal grants. Southern Economic Journal 48(2): 393–399.
Schwartz, T. (1981). The universal-instability theorem. Public Choice 37(3): 487–501.
Thompson, E. A., and Faith, R. L. (1981). A pure theory of strategic behavior and Social institutions. American Economic Review 71(3): 366–380.
Tullock, G. (1981). Why so much stability? Public Choice 37(2): 189–202.
Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., and Johnsen, C. (1981). The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political Economy 89(4): 642–664.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Holcombe, R.G., Zardkoohi, A. On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states. Public Choice 40, 165–174 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118518
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118518