Abstract
Methods of demand theory are applied to the problem of the existence of a social welfare function under specific public choice algorithms. Integrability conditions, necessary for the derivation of social demand functions from utility maximization, are used. The social choice function, which chooses the mean of all voters demand for public goods to be the public provision, is analysed in detail. Necessary conditions for the existence of a social utility function, and by implication, a transative social ordering, are derived for this case. These conditions imply restrictions on individual preferences.
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Additional information
Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara. T. Bergstrom, R. Deacon, J. Marshall and C. Plott read and commented on early drafts. Their comments as well as those of the editor and referees are greatly appreciated. The work was done while the author was in residence with the Office of Research Methods and Standards of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The BLS neither endorses nor is responsible for any part of this paper.
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Shapiro, P. Revealed public preference and social utility. Public Choice 33, 103–115 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118360
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118360