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The effects of abstentions on election outcomes

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Additional information

The School of Management, Clarkson College, and The College of Business Administration, The Pennsylvania State University, respectively. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation.

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Gehrlein, W.V., Fishburn, P.C. The effects of abstentions on election outcomes. Public Choice 33, 69–82 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00118358

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