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This paper is part of the Project ‘Economic Policy and Conflicts of Interests’ of the University of Amsterdam.
Assistant Professor of Public Finance, University of Amsterdam. Research assistance by Mr. A.M. Groot is gratefully acknowledged. Helpful comments by Professors Gordon Tullock and Frans van Winden greatly improved the presentation of this paper.
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Verbon, H.A.A. The rise and evolution of public pension systems. Public Choice 52, 75–100 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00116944
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00116944