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On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 11794, Stony Brook, NY

    James M. Enelow

  2. University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA

    Melvin J. Hinisch

Authors
  1. James M. Enelow
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  2. Melvin J. Hinisch
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Additional information

This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants SES-8111411 and SOC-7900034.

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Enelow, J.M., Hinisch, M.J. On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium. Public Choice 40, 317–321 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114527

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