Abstract
This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953–1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the ‘partisan’ motives behind government spending are clearly revealed: left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health care than right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defense more than left-wing parties.
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Constructive comments by Frans van Winden, Wilko Letterie, Peter Cornelisse, Arie Ros, André de Moor, Harry ter Rele and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.
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Van Dalen, H.P., Swank, O.H. Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic?. Public Choice 89, 183–200 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114285
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114285