Abstract
The present paper uses a paneldata estimation technique to combine the time series for individual countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). We postulated the response of central banks in these countries to inflation, economic growth and current account surplus given the constraints to be the same among the sample countries. Differences between central bank independence come forward in a different structural pressure to lower or raise money market rates in these countries. The empirical results in this study coincide remarkably well with the legal indices of central bank independence.
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Eijffinger, S., Van Rooij, M. & Schaling, E. Central bank independence: A paneldata approach. Public Choice 89, 163–182 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114284
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00114284