Abstract
During the past 40 years there has been an accumulation of experimental evidence suggesting that most of the axioms of expected utility theory are liable to be systematically violated by substantial numbers of individuals. Much of this evidence has focused on failures of the independence axiom and has stimulated a number of alternative models that try to explain that evidence in various ways. This article presents a fresh experiment that looks at a different kind of violation—one that does not appear to be easily accommodated by several of the more prominent alternative models as they are currently formulated.
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The experimental work reported in this article was funded by Economic and Social Research Council Award No. B 00 23 2163.
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Loomes, G. Evidence of a new violation of the independence axiom. J Risk Uncertainty 4, 91–108 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00057888
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00057888