Abstract
Intransitive preferences have been a topic of curiosity, study, and debate over the past 40 years. Many economists and decision theorists insist on transitivity as the cornerstone of rational choice, and even in behavioral decision theory intransitivities are often attributed to faulty experiments, random or sloppy choices, poor judgment, or unexamined biases. But others see intransitive preferences as potential truths of reasoned comparisons and propose representations of preferences that accommodate intransitivities.
This article offers a partial survey of models for intransitive preferences in a variety of decisional contexts. These include economic consumer theory, multiattribute utility theory, game theory, preference between time streams, and decision making under risk and uncertainty. The survey is preceded by a discussion of issues that bear on the relevance and reasonableness of intransitivity.
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I thank Irving LaValle and Duncan Luce for valuable comments on a previous version of this article.
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Fishburn, P.C. Nontransitive preferences in decision theory. J Risk Uncertainty 4, 113–134 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00056121
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00056121
Key words
- nontransitive preferences
- nonlinear utility
- decision theory