Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to explore the implications for public policy of the assumption that policy makers exhibit the same cognitive and perceptual problems as other citizens regarding catastrophic events. The key conclusion is that the same factors that cause citizens to behave inefficiently in preparing for and responding to disasters also will cause inefficiencies in policies concerning catastrophic events. Among the more important expected pathologies of disaster policies are: (1) a failure to balance benefits and costs at the margin for different types of disasters, due to cognitive pathologies such as availability and overconfidence; (2) a tendency for policy to underinvest in protection and overinvest in response; and (3) a skepticism for policies based on sound insurance principles for spreading costs and assessing claims.
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Noll, R.G. The complex politics of catastrophe economics. J Risk Uncertainty 12, 141–146 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00055790
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00055790