Abstract
We first show that, in general, a majority-voting game with vote-selling will not have any equilibria. We then evaluate the desirability of vote-selling, using a rudimentary ‘theory of blocking trajectories.’
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bergstrom, T.C. (1979). When does majority rule supply public goods efficiently? Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81: 216–226.
Bernholz, P. (1973). Logrolling, Arrow Paradox and cyclical majorities. Public Choice 15: 87–95.
Bernholz, P. (1975). Grundlagen der politischen Ökonomie 2: 10–25. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
Bowen, H. (1943). The interpretation of voting in the allocation of resources. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58: 27–48.
Buchanan, J.M., and Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Cohen, L. (1979). Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models. Journal of Economic Theory 20: 1–12.
Feldman, A.M. (1974). Recontracting stability. Econometrica 42: 35–44.
Green, J. (1974). The stability of Edgeworth's recontracting process. Econometrica 42: 21–34.
Kramer, G.H. (1973). On a class of equilibrium conditions for majority rule. Econometrica 41: 285–297.
Kramer, G.H., and Klevorick, A.K. (1974). Existence of a ‘local’ cooperative equilibrium in a class of voting games. Review of Economic Studies 41 (4): 539–548.
McCloskey, D. (1982). The applied theory of price. New York: Maxmillan.
McKelvey, R.D. (1979). General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. Econometrica 47: 1085–1111.
Okun, A.M. (1975). Equality and efficiency: The big trade-off. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
Schofield, N. (1983). Generic instability of majority rule. Review of Economic Studies 50 (4): 695–705.
Slutsky, S. (1977). A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 14: 299–325.
Stiglitz, J.E. (1974). The demand for education in public and private school systems. Journal of Public Economics 3: 349–385.
Tobin, J. (1970). On limiting the domain of inequality. Journal of Law and Economics 13: 263–277.
Weiss, J.H. (1979). The impact of vote-selling on a majority-voting game. Baruch College Working Paper.
Weiss, J.H. (1986). Can donations reduce a donor's welfare? Public Choice 37: 337–347.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
I am grateful to Donald Gordon, Norman Kleinberg, Roger Mesznik, Peter Aranson and a referee for their many helpful comments. The results of Section 3 originally appeared in my 1979 working paper, while Section 4 owes much to the probing questions of an unknown referee.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Weiss, J.H. Is vote-selling desirable?. Public Choice 59, 177–194 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00054453
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00054453