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Methodological problems in evolutionary biology VII. The species plague

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Abstract

Various philosophers and evolutionary biologists have recently defended the thesis that species are individuals rather than sets. A decade of debates, however, did not suffice to settle the matter. Conceptual analysis shows that many of the key terms involved (“individuation”, “evolutionary species”, “spatiotemporal restrictedness”, “individual”) are ambiguous. Current disagreements should dissolve once this is recognized. Explication of the concepts involved leads to new programs for philosophical research. It could also help biology by showing how extant controversies concerning evolution may have conceptual rather than factual roots.

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van der Steen, W.J., Voorzanger, B. Methodological problems in evolutionary biology VII. The species plague. Acta Biotheor 35, 205–221 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00052601

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