Skip to main content

A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities

Abstract

Weisberg and Grofman (1981) propose a rational choice model of voter turnout which they test with data from the 1976 Presidential election. We extend and generalize that model to cover a wide variety of forms of electoral participation including working on a campaign, wearing campaign buttons, and talking to others about the campaign. We find that voters who see a difference between the candidates, with one candidate positively evaluated and the other negatively, are roughly twice as likely to participate in high involvement electoral activities as are those who are alienated from or indifferent to the candidates.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

References

  • Barry, B. (1970). Sociologists, economists, and democracy. New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brody, R.A., and Grofman, B. (1982). Stimulus differentiation and stimulus complexity as factors affecting turnout in two-candidate and multi-candidate races. Political Behavior 4: 83–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brody, R.A., and Page, B.I. (1973). Indifference, alienation and rational decisions and the effects of candidates' evaluations on turnout and the vote. Public Choice 15: 1–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foster, C.B. (1984). The performance of rational voter models in recent presidential elections. American Political Science Review 78: 678–690.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garvey, G. (1966). The theory of party equilibrium. American Political Science Review 60: 9–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grofman B. (1983). Models of voter turnout: An idiosyncratic review. Public Choice 41: 55–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hinich, M.J. (1978). Some evidence on non-voting models in the spatial theory of electoral competition. Public Choice 33: 83–102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hinich, M.J., and Ordeshook, P.C. (1969). Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process. Public Choice 8: 81–100.

    Google Scholar 

  • Light, R.J., and Pillemer, D.B. (1984). Summing up: The science of reviewing research. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W., and Ordeshook, P. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review 62: 25–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verba, S., and Nie, N.H. (1972). Participation in America. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weisberg, H.F., and Grofman, B. (1981). Candidate evaluations and turnout. American Politics Quarterly 9: 197–219.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wuffle, A (1984) Should you brush your teeth on November 6, 1984? PS (Summer): 577–580.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

We are indebted to Deanna Knickerbocker, Matt Fenner and the staff of the Word Processing Center, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, for manuscript preparation and to the Computer Center at California State University and ICPSR for data archives resources and computer services. The paper was begun while the second-named author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Norrander, B., Grofman, B. A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities. Public Choice 57, 187–192 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00052406

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00052406

Keywords

  • Electoral Activity
  • Public Finance
  • Choice Model
  • Rational Choice
  • Presidential Election