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Rent-seeking with non-identical players

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References

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  1. Department of Economics, Queen Mary College, Mile End Road, E1 4NS, London

    Richard J. Allard

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  1. Richard J. Allard
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Allard, R.J. Rent-seeking with non-identical players. Public Choice 57, 3–14 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00052255

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