The evolution of reactive strategies for repeated 2×2-games occurring in biology is investigated by means of an adaptive dynamics.
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Nowak, M., Sigmund, K. The evolution of stochastic strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Acta Appl Math 20, 247–265 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00049570
AMS subject classifications (1980)
- Prisoner's Dilemma
- reactive strategies
- iterated games
- adaptive dynamics