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Börsenrückzüge infolge steigender Corporate-Governance-Anforderungen – Empirische Evidenz von 13 europäischen Kapitalmärkten

  • Marc BerningerEmail author
  • Markus Klug
  • Dirk Schiereck
Originalartikel
  • 434 Downloads

Zusammenfassung

Die Notierungszahlen an den großen Börsenplätzen der westlichen Welt sind seit längerer Zeit stark rückläufig. Nicht nur die Börsenplatzbetreiber, sondern zunehmend auch die Politik und Wissenschaft befassen sich mit diesem Trend, bevorzugt ausgehend von der Fragestellung, wie neue Unternehmen für einen Börsengang gewonnen werden können. Gleichzeitig zeichnen sich in den vergangenen Jahren jedoch auch bedeutsame Veränderungen im regulatorischen Umfeld börsennotierter Unternehmen ab, die die Rechte von Aktionären stärken sowie insbesondere die Transparenz und Korrektheit der Rechnungslegung erhöhen sollen. Während dadurch das Nutzenniveau der Kapitalgeberseite gesteigert wurde, haben die neuen Regulierungen für börsennotierte Unternehmen auf der Kapitalnehmerseite für Zusatzkosten gesorgt, die insbesondere kleine Unternehmen belasten und einen Börsenrückzug nahelegen könnten. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird anhand eines umfassenden Paneldatensatzes aus 770 Delistingankündigungen für 13 europäische Börsenplätze für den Zeitraum 2005 bis 2016 mittels (multinomialen) logistischen Regressionen das Zusammenwirken aus Veränderungen im Regulierungsniveau und der Aufkündigung von Börsennotierungen durch kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmen untersucht. Es kann für alle untersuchten Länder ein signifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen steigenden Corporate Governance-Anforderungen und einer Zunahme von Börsenrückzügen beobachtet werden. Allerdings ist der in früheren Studien beobachtete Rückgang insolvenzbedingter Börsenrückzüge nicht mehr feststellbar. Die präsentierten Ergebnisse sind robust unter Verwendung mehrerer unabhängiger „Shareholder Protection“-Indizes.

Schlüsselwörter

Delistings Corporate Governance Finanzkrise Governancekosten Kapitalmarktregulierung 

Delistings due to Increased Corporate Governance Requirements – Empirical Evidence from 13 European Capital Markets

Abstract

The number of listed companies at the western countries’ stock exchanges has been declining strongly over recent years. Stock exchanges as well as politics and scientists are engaged in finding new possibilities to increase the number of initial public offerings. Nevertheless, there have been strong regulatory changes in the context of stock exchange participation in recent years, both in the US (e. g. Sarbanes-Oxley-Act) as well as in the European Union (e. g. subsequent to the action plan “Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance”). These new regulations strengthen the shareholder’s privileges and enhance transparency and correctness of e. g. financial disclosures. While this is clearly beneficial for shareholders, the new regulations cause high additional costs for listed companies, especially for small and medium-sized companies, which might subsequently promote their delisting from the stock exchange. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the concurrence of regulatory changes and withdrawal from stock exchange participation by means of a logistic regression with data from 770 delisting announcements of 13 European stock exchanges between 2005 and 2016. This time span encompasses both the global financial crisis with its climax 2008/2009 and the subsequent rebound of capital markets, therefore allowing analyses and statements of different market phases. The results show a significant correlation between a strengthening in corporate governance regulation requirements and delistings of companies from the stock exchange in all analyzed countries. This effect is most prominent for small companies. Furthermore, higher corporate governance regulation requirements now seems to fail in preventing firms from becoming insolvent. The presented results are robust also when utilizing several independent “Shareholder Protection” proxies.

Keywords

Delistings Corporate governance Financial crisis Costs of governance Capital market regulation 

JEL-Klassifikation

G01 G18 G34 G38 K20 K22 

Notes

Danksagung

Die Autoren danken dem betreuenden Herausgeber und einem anonymen Gutachter für die wertvollen Anregungen und Kommentare.

Interessenkonflikt

M. Berninger, M. Klug und D. Schiereck geben an, dass kein Interessenkonflikt besteht.

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Copyright information

© Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fachgebiet Unternehmensfinanzierung, Fachbereich Rechts- und WirtschaftswissenschaftenTechnische Universität DarmstadtDarmstadtDeutschland

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