Advertisement

Discussion of “Location in a Disk City with Consumer Concentration Around the Center”

  • Karl MoraschEmail author
Comment
  • 13 Downloads

Where do firms locate in geographical or product space? The paper by Manfred Stadler tries to shed some new light on this issue by extending the one-dimensional city line of the seminal Hotelling model to a two-dimensional disk. At least for the location interpretation this seems to be a more realistic assumption. While there have been already some other papers that also consider a two-dimensional setting (either rectangular or circular), the specific contribution of Stadler’s paper is the analysis of different classes of symmetric two-dimensional distributions of consumer locations that allow a parametrization of the degree of concentration around the center. In particular, he shows that for all such distributions both firms locate symmetrically on a line through the center and move closer to the center if the degree of concentration is increased.

From a technical point of view, it is very nice that the model is structured in a way that allows the derivation of explicit solutions for...

Notes

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

References

  1. Bester, H., A. De Palma, W. Leininger, J. Thomas, and E.-L. von Thadden. 1996. A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling’s location game. Games and Economic Behavior 12(2):165–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Brenner, S. 2005. Hotelling games with three, four, and more players. Journal of Regional Science 45(4):851–864.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Feldin, A. 2012. Three firms on a unit disk market: Intermediate product differentiation. Economic and Business Review 14(4):321–345.Google Scholar
  4. Irmen, A., and J.-F. Thisse. 1998. Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right. Journal of Economic Theory 78(1):76–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Salop, S.C. 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10(1):141–156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Tabuchi, T., and J.-F. Thisse. 1995. Asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization 13(2):213–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität der Bundeswehr MünchenNeubibergGermany

Personalised recommendations