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Homo Oeconomicus

, Volume 36, Issue 1–2, pp 7–23 | Cite as

Apple Trees for Firewood: James Buchanan’s Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment in the Context of U.S. Fiscal Policy

  • Romina BocciaEmail author
Research Paper

Abstract

Throughout his academic career James Buchanan was deeply concerned about the proclivity of constitutional democracies to go into debt. He feared that the process of accumulating public debt would increase the tax burden on individuals to an extent that would eventually be fiscally unsustainable and subversive for liberty. This paper uses the example of the U.S. to illustrate, in concrete terms rather than abstract modeling, that Buchanan seems vindicated by the facts. To sideline him as a doomsayer and dismiss his balanced budget policy proposal out of hand would be inappropriate.

Keywords

Balanced budget amendment Fiscal expansion Keynesianism 

JEL Classification

Public economics H1 H6 

Notes

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Grover M. Hermann Center for the Federal BudgetThe Heritage FoundationWashingtonUSA

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