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List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik

, Volume 44, Issue 4, pp 789–825 | Cite as

Klassische Institutionenökonomik

Der „Amerikanische Institutionalismus“, die „Original Institutional Economics“ (OIE) oder Evolutionär-Institutionelle Ökonomik. Übersicht, exemplarische Vertiefungen und Gesamtbeurteilung
  • Wolfram ElsnerEmail author
Aufsätze

Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag stellt die Grundzüge der sog. Originären Institutionellen Ökonomik (OIE), in Abgrenzung zum neoklassischen „Mainstream“ und seiner Neuen Institutionellen Ökonomik (NIE), dar. Neben den Unterschieden zum „Mainstream“ fokussiert der Beitrag auf theoriegeschichtliche Wurzeln dieses auch „Amerikanischer Institutionalismus“ genannten Paradigmas (begründet durch T. B. Veblen, J. R. Commons, W. C. Mitchell u. a.), auf metatheoretische Wurzeln im amerikanischen sog. Philosophischen Pragmatismus (C. S. Peirce, J. Dewey u. a.) und entsprechende methodologische Merkmale, auf organisatorische Verfasstheit und Wirkungsgeschichte des Institutionalismus (Personen, Schulen, Associations, Journals, Einfluss auf andere Paradigmata und Disziplinen, Politikberatung), auf Menschenbild und Handlungskonzept, auf das Verhältnis von permanentem evolutionärem Wandel und relativ stabilen sozialen Institutionen als „Zwischenlösungen“, auf den Institutionenbegriff selbst, die sog. Veblenianische „institutionelle Dichotomie“ und das darauf aufbauende Konzept des institutionellen Wandels, schließlich auf einige Anwendungsbereiche in der Theorie der Unternehmung und der Industrieökonomik sowie sein Politikkonzept.

Schlüsselwörter

Evolution Institutionalismus Institutionelle Dichotomie Institutioneller Wandel Institutionen Instrumentalismus Menschenbild Methodologie Originäre Institutionelle Ökonomik (OIE) Sozialer und ökonomischer Wandel Theorie der Unternehmung Veblen Wirtschaftspolitik Zeremonialismus 

Classical institutional economics

American institutionalism, OIE, or evolutionary-institutional economics. overview, implications, and evaluation

Abstract

The paper analyzes the main features of classical institutional economics, also known as evolutionary economics, original institutional economics (OIE) or American Institutionalism. We address its differences with the neoclassical “mainstream” and the new institutional economics (NIE). We reconstruct institutionalism in the history of economic thought, consider its relation to pragmatist philosophy, and discuss its ontological foundations and methodological implications. We present representatives, schools, associations, journals, and its policy impacts in the USA in the 1920s and 1930s. Also, its relations with other disciplines such as evolutionary biology, psychology, or, more recently, complex-system sciences are explained. The ideas of man and human agency, systemic perspective, evolutionary change, technological and behavioral innovations, and institutions as transitory solutions for defined collecive decision problems are discussed. Further, we explain the Veblenian institutional dichotomy and the resulting theory of institutional change. Applications considered relate to the theory of the firm, industrial economics, and policies. The paper concludes with an overall evaluation of the relevance of OIE among modern economics, social, natural, and namely complexity sciences.

Keywords

Institutions Institutional economics Institutionalism Institutional dichotomy Institutional change Evolution Methodological systemism Complexity Technology and institutions Economic ontology Veblen Human agency Embeddedness Pattern modeling Instrumentalism Theory of the firm Economic policy Economic pluralism 

JEL Codes

B15 B25 B40 B52 D01 D02 D90 P11 Z13 

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, iino – Institut für Institutionelle Ökonomik und InnovationsökonomikUniversität BremenBremenDeutschland

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