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List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 197–219 | Cite as

Verhaltensökonomische Theorie der Politik und die Robustheit politischer Institutionen

  • Jan SchnellenbachEmail author
Aufsätze

Zusammenfassung

Es werden die Probleme politischer Entscheidungsverfahren aus Sicht einer verhaltensökonomischen Theorie der Politik (Behavioral Political Economy) diskutiert. Es zeigt sich, dass zum Teil auch unter diesen Bedingungen der Einsatz von bekannten und bewährten institutionellen Regelungen sinnvoll ist. Parlamentarische checks and balances oder eine regelgebundene Politik können sowohl helfen, konventionelle Kontrollprobleme zwischen Bürger und Repräsentanten zu lösen, als auch den Spielraum für das Wirken problematischer Entscheidungsverzerrungen zu reduzieren. Es zeigt sich aber auch, dass darüber hinaus institutionelle Innovationen sinnvoll sein könnten. Dies betrifft insbesondere die Installation neuer, von der Tagespolitik unabhängiger Organisationen, die helfen können, zu einer Versachlichung von Debatten beizutragen und beispielsweise extrem verzerrte Risikowahrnehmungen durch sachbezogene Aufklärung zu konterkarieren.

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Copyright information

© List-Gesellschaft e.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fakultät 5, Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Lehrstuhl für VWL, insb. MikroökonomikBrandenburgische Technische UniversitätCottbusDeutschland

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