Abstract
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.
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Notes
See also Alai 2015 for further discussion.
In Colombia, the 100-point confidence scales for Knowledge 1 and Knowledge 2 were replaced with 7-point scales.
In Korea the 18-item NFC scale was replaced with the standardized 15-item NFC scale in Korean (Kim 2007).
While our scale ranged from 1 to 7, the data from Germany ranged from 1 to 8. We do not know where the disagreement comes from. Assuming a coding error, we decided to transform the 8’s into 7’s.
TIPI codes for emotional stability, the inverse of neuroticism. So high scores correspond to a low neuroticism.
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Acknowledgements
This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Fuller Theological Seminary/Thrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation.
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Machery, E., Stich, S., Rose, D. et al. The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 34, 517–541 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-017-0113-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-017-0113-y