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Journal of Quantitative Economics

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 197–213 | Cite as

On General and Specific Transfers for Child Support in Divorce

  • Tilak SanyalEmail author
  • Vivekananda Mukherjee
Original Article
  • 9 Downloads

Abstract

In a post-divorce equilibrium under joint legal custody of a child the paper compares the effect of two different transfer schemes, a general purpose transfer scheme and a specific purpose transfer scheme, from non-custodial parent to the custodial parent of the child on his/her welfare. Surprisingly, it finds that the marginal effects are neutral. The result contributes to the policy framework by suggesting that the lawyers/courts can choose the two alternatives equivalently in settling the child custody cases in a post-divorce situation. The paper also characterizes such transfer schemes and proves that the schemes can never restore the child’s welfare at the ‘happy marriage’ equilibrium level.

Keywords

Marriage Divorce General purpose transfer Specific purpose transfer Private provision of public goods 

JEL Classification

J13 J18 C72 

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Copyright information

© The Indian Econometric Society 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsShibpur Dinobundhoo CollegeHowrahIndia
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsJadavpur UniversityKolkataIndia

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