Journal of Quantitative Economics

, Volume 16, Issue 2, pp 527–552 | Cite as

Electoral Cycles and Project Outcomes

Original Article
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Abstract

Using a novel dataset on announced project-level investments, we examine the determination of project outcomes and the role of elections. Using India as a case study, the findings suggest that projects announced by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibit a lower probability of completion. Furthermore, we show that projects announced by SOEs have a higher probability of being abandoned. Our results are consistent with the political view of government ownership where elected representatives make investment promises that are subsequently reneged.

Keywords

Project Abandoned State-owned Election India 

JEL Classification

G 31 G 38 
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Copyright information

© The Indian Econometric Society 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Advanced Financial Research and LearningMumbaiIndia

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