On the effectiveness of elected male and female leaders and team coordination
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We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader’s gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams with elected leaders coordinate on higher effort levels. Initially, the benefits of being elected are captured solely by male leaders. However, this gender difference disappears with repeated interaction because unsuccessful male leaders are reelected more often than unsuccessful female leaders.
KeywordsGender differences Leadership Democracy effect Leader effectiveness Coordination
JEL classificationM14 M54 J16 C92
This research was funded with the faculty research funds of Columbia University (No. ID0ENSAE1241).
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