Rule of Law v. the Rule of Men and Women: What’s in the Distinction?
- 33 Downloads
Martin Krygier’s enormous contribution to rule-of-law scholarship is both original and compelling—two characteristics which rarely go hand in hand in a scholarly world in which almost everything has been said about anything of importance (and also so much about things of no importance at all). It is, first, original, because his main thesis—that the rule of law should be interpreted teleologically rather than anatomically—goes against much of the conventional wisdom in legal scholarship and practice which privileges a checklist approach. The longevity of rules? Publicity? Non-retrospectivity? Judicial independence? etc.—when a sufficient number of items are ticked, the system is validated as rule-of-law compatible, under a conventional, “anatomical” conception. Second, it is compelling because once one considers Krygier’s argument that what reallymatters for our concerns about the rule of law, and what animates our “checklist”, is a deeper purpose having to do with the tempering of...
- Hayek FA (1960) The constitution of liberty. Henry Regnery, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
- Nagel T (1987) Moral conflict and political legitimacy. Philos Public Aff 16:215–240Google Scholar
- Nagel T (1991) Equality and partiality. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
- Pettit P (2014) Just freedom. WW Norton, New York, p 2014Google Scholar
- Ripstein A (1999) Equality, responsibility, and the law. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar