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Customer Needs and Solutions

, Volume 5, Issue 1–2, pp 121–136 | Cite as

Beyond Posted Prices: the Past, Present, and Future of Participative Pricing Mechanisms

  • Martin SpannEmail author
  • Robert Zeithammer
  • Marco Bertini
  • Ernan Haruvy
  • Sandy D. Jap
  • Oded Koenigsberg
  • Vincent Mak
  • Peter Popkowski Leszczyc
  • Bernd Skiera
  • Manoj Thomas
Research Article

Abstract

Driven by the low transaction costs and interactive nature of the internet, customer participation in the price-setting process has increased. Today, platforms such as eBay have popularized online auctions on a global scale, Priceline has made headlines with its name-your-own-price (NYOP) business model, and Humble Bundle has enabled independent musicians and game developers to market their works through pay-what-you-want (PWYW) pricing. Advertising exchanges conduct several hundred million individual auctions per day to sell online advertising slots. The present paper contributes to the literature on participative pricing in three ways. First, we propose a definition of participative pricing mechanisms, as well as a useful taxonomy. Second, we discuss the current understanding by synthesizing conceptual and empirical academic literature. Third, we outline promising research questions with a key focus on the related behavioral aspects of buyers and sellers.

Keywords

Auction Name-your-own-price Pay-what-you-want Bargaining Outcome and process utility Taxonomy 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Spann
    • 1
    Email author
  • Robert Zeithammer
    • 2
  • Marco Bertini
    • 3
  • Ernan Haruvy
    • 4
  • Sandy D. Jap
    • 5
  • Oded Koenigsberg
    • 6
  • Vincent Mak
    • 7
  • Peter Popkowski Leszczyc
    • 8
  • Bernd Skiera
    • 9
  • Manoj Thomas
    • 10
  1. 1.Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU Munich)MunichGermany
  2. 2.University of California, Los AngelesLos AngelesUSA
  3. 3.ESADESant Cugat del VallèsSpain
  4. 4.University of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA
  5. 5.Emory UniversityAtlantaUSA
  6. 6.London Business SchoolLondonUnited Kingdom
  7. 7.Cambridge Judge Business School, University of CambridgeCambridgeUnited Kingdom
  8. 8.University of AlbertaEdmontonCanada
  9. 9.Goethe University FrankfurtFrankfurtGermany
  10. 10.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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