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Equilibria in games with weak payoff externalities

  • Takuya Iimura
  • Toshimasa Maruta
  • Takahiro Watanabe
Research Article
  • 8 Downloads

Abstract

Ania (J Econ Behav Organ 65:472–488, 2008) shows that in the class of symmetric games with weak payoff externalities, symmetric Nash equilibria are equivalent to symmetric evolutionary equilibria (Schaffer in J Econ Behav Organ 12:29–45, 1989). We introduce a notion of a game with partial weak payoff externalities. We show that the class of games with partial weak payoff externalities includes most of previously known classes of games in which the equivalence prevails. We also establish a number of pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence results for a game with weak payoff externalities, and for a class of games that includes games with partial weak payoff externalities. The results include, in particular, the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in some finite games.

Keywords

Existence of equilibrium Evolutionary equilibrium Weak payoff externalities Weakly unilaterally competitive games Weakly competitive games Potential games 

JEL Classification

C72 (Noncooperative games) C73 (Evolutionary games) 

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Copyright information

© Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Economics and Business AdministrationTokyo Metropolitan UniversityTokyoJapan
  2. 2.College of EconomicsNihon UniversityTokyoJapan

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