Economic Theory Bulletin

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 213–229 | Cite as

Noncooperative games, coupling constraints, and partial efficiency

  • Sjur Didrik Flåm
Research Article


Many noncooperative settings require sharing of aggregate holdings—be these of natural resources, production tasks, or pollution permits. This paper considers instances where the shared items eventually become competitively priced. For that reason, the solution concept incorporates features of Nash and Walras equilibria. Focus is on how the concerned agents, by themselves, may reach an outcome of such sort. A main mechanism is direct bilateral exchange, repeated time and again.


Coupling constraints Normalized Nash equilibrium Partial efficiency Bilateral exchange Monotonicity Stability Convergence 

JEL Classification

C62 C72 D43 D62 



Thanks are due: for support CESifo, München and the Arne Ryde Foundation, Lund–and for hospitality the University of Alicante.


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Copyright information

© Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Economics DepartmentUniversity of BergenBergenNorway

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