Economic Theory Bulletin

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 53–64 | Cite as

Equilibrium selection through \(\mathbf {p}_{u}\)-dominance

  • Andrea GalliceEmail author
Research Article


The paper introduces and discusses the concept of \(\mathbf {p}_{u}\)-dominance in the context of finite games in normal form. It then presents the \(\mathbf { p}_{u}\)-dominance criterion for equilibrium selection. The \(\mathbf {p}_{u}\)-dominance criterion is inspired by and closely related to the \(\mathbf {p}\)-dominance criterion originally proposed by Morris et al. (Econometrica 63:145–157, 1995). However, there are games in which the two criteria lead to different refinements. We provide sufficient conditions under which equilibrium selection through \(\mathbf {p}_{u}\)-dominance is weakly finer (respectively, coarser) than equilibrium selection through \(\mathbf {p}\)-dominance.


Equilibrium selection Normal form games \(\mathbf {p}_{u}\)-Dominance \(\mathbf {p}\)-Dominance 

JEL Classification

C72 C73 


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Copyright information

© Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and StatisticsUniversity of TorinoTurinItaly
  2. 2.Collegio Carlo AlbertoMoncalieriItaly

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