The Roles of the United States in the China–US–Japan Trilateral Relations

Triangular relations have been a classic topic of international relations. Numerous works have been done on the topic. Among them, Michel Tatu’s The Great Power Triangle: Washington-Moscow-Paris (1970); Thomas M. Gottlieb’s Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle (1977); Gerald Segal’s The Great Power Triangle (1982), Lowell Dittmer’s “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis” World Politics (July 1981) and Kissinger’s Diplomacy (1994). ¹

The most classic triangular relations were the US–China-Soviet relations during the Cold War which dramatically changed the Cold War power distribution: the balance of power tilted in favor of the US and China side. After the Cold War, with China’s rise, another set of most important triangular relations emerged: the China–US–Japan triangular relation. The three powers are the most important powers in the world plus complex historical legacies. Though economic interdependence is at a significant high level among them, strategic suspicion has never been dissolved in security arena. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore the dynamics of this triangular relation and find out the prospect of development and changes of this set of relations.

Lowell Dittmer classifies the triangular relations among players as either “positive” or “negative”. He suggested four logically possible triangular configurations:(1) the “unit veto”, consisting of negative relationships between each player and both others; (2) the “marriage,” consisting of a positive relationship between the two spouses each of whom have negative relationships with a third “pariah”; (3) a “romantic triangle,” consisting of positive relationships between one “pivot” player and two “wing” players, who in turn have better relations with the pivot than they have with each other; and (4) the “menage a trois”, consisting of positive relationships among all three players. ² The “romantic triangle” type means the party in the “hub” position establishes a harmonious relationship with both sides in the “wings”, meanwhile relations between its two neighbors are not close, perhaps even hostile. This structure looks like a thin isosceles triangle with the hub on the top. Dittmer believes that the hub in the “romantic marriage” is the most advantageous position for any country, because keeping friendly relations with both “wings” will reduce the cost of maintaining the relationships with them. Simultaneously it gains more flexibility for itself because of the confrontation between the other two countries. Therefore, all rational countries will strive for this position, but only the competent one can get it.

China–US–Japan trilateral relations are one of the world’s most important trilateral relations. All the three players are global powers in virtually every dimension in terms of national power. They are the top three runners in terms of world economy. They are the first three oil consumers; they possess the largest arsenals in the world and have the most advanced military in the world. If the China–US–Japan strategic triangle isn’t the most important trilateral relationship in the world, it will be. ³

As the sole dominating power, the United States has been playing different roles in the trilateral relations since the end of World War II: first established a “stable marriage” with Japan in order to contain (the Soviet Union and) China during the Cold War, and then took one part in the “menage a trois” pattern after improving relations with China in 1972. However, with the Soviet Union’s collapse, a common rival for the three disappeared; therefore, the glue for harmonious relationship was gone. Meanwhile, Chinese domestic political reform was set back at the end of 1980′s which turned as a catalyst for the alienation between China and the other two players. In the evolution of the triangular relations, the US explicitly pursued the pivot position in the “romantic marriage” model after the Cold War. The US has been skillfully managing the trilateral relations according to its needs by far. It seems to continue to benefit from the trilateral interactions through delicate adjustment and maintenance of its positions.

In 1991 after the Cold War, James Baker, secretary of state under George Bush senior, defined in 1991: a “hub and spoke system” in which the US was the core and other countries were the spokes, and every country had to go through the US to get where it wanted to be. ⁴ This can actually be regarded as a combination of many trilateral romantic marriage patterns, while the US is always the only country in the hub position. Since then America gradually determined to build this framework in Asia. During the Clinton administration in 1995, the US “East Asia Security Strategy Report” pointed out that US’ interests in Asia are peace and security, access to the region’s commercial market, freedom of navigation and prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition. ⁵ This strategy has not significantly been changed till now. The core of it consists of two elements: First, gaining the commercial access to this region is always the main purpose when America began to communicate with the East Asia, which is still the vital interests in East Asia nowadays; Second, the East Asia cannot be controlled by any anti-American or hostile powers. One of the basic principles of US national security is to prevent East Asia from being controlled by one nation since the 19th century. In 2009 Defense Secretary Robert Gates reiterated in Singapore that “For decades after World War II, Asia’s security architecture mostly reflected a “hub and spokes” model, with the United States as the “hub” and the “spokes” representing a series of bilateral alliances with other countries that did not necessarily cooperate much with each other.” He stressed that “regional multilateral institutions” did ‘not mean any weakening of our bilateral ties, but rather enhancing security by adding to them (bilateral relations)’. ⁶ Such structure can be beneficial to America in two aspects: First, to ensure the balance of the entire system in the way of America’s expectation by initiatively adjusting the distance between the hub and different spokes; Second, to dominate the situation of the whole region through the unique advantages of the hub that countries positioned in spokes will never have.

Christopher Ryan put forward the “Offshore Balancing Grand Strategy”, which means that America should manage and control the regional situation by adjusting and keeping the balance among various powers in terms of America’s interests, instead of rashly getting involved in the conflict in which America does not have a critical interest. Learning from the British historical model of off shore balancing strategy, Ryan believes this is the best way to guarantee America’s interest, and its biggest benefits are to avoid direct conflict, lower costs and reduce risk. ⁷ Fareed Zakaria thinks that the US enjoys the sufficient conditions of exerting “Offshore Balance”: the rise of other powers is true, but the process of pursuing is still long and slow. Therefore, as a remote outsider, America is often regarded as the most reliable friend by those who worry about the rise of the hegemonic state in their regions. In fact, just as William Wohlforth pointed out, precisely because of the growth of regional power, America is able to strengthen its influence. ⁸ The United States has both the hard power that far outweighs all Asian countries and the positive and relatively dependable images that are generally recognized and accepted in international stage. ⁹ Its diplomatic tradition of active interference in international affairs provides another necessary condition establish its position as balancer.

In the trilateral relations, China and Japan are the major powers in Asia, therefore the most important players in the arena of America’s Asia policy. American scholars believe that China’s core interest is to obtain the comprehensive space of strategic development. Beijing seeks to keep the territories integrity, not to be contained, and not to be excluded by the international system. Japan’s core interest is to maintain the smooth flow of its international links. Tokyo seeks not to be surpassed, isolated, as well as gagged. America’s core interest is to ensure the stability of this region under its lead. The stability surely means benefit-sharing, but Washington wants to retain the leader position, because America and other countries have not yet found another trustworthy stability provider with such desire and such capability. ¹⁰ It means that the core interests among the three countries are basically compatible, while there are some interests overlapping areas that may lead to conflict. Therefore, the United States must use its own special status to appropriately manage and control the trilateral relations, not only to ensure neither China nor Japan can challenge US hegemony in East Asia, but also to maintain the basic state of peace among the three countries so that the US can keep profiting from it. For this reason, America hopes to see a China with domestic stability, playing a constructive role in the international community rather than being hostile to the US, a Japan with more confidence and independence, able to play more international role while still under control of America in security area, and a Sino-Japan relations with both sustained friction and relatively stable contact between the two countries, which will invite America’s management but without paying excessive costs. Mainly through the delicate adjustment of its China and Japan policy, especially with the policy choice of becoming the hub of the trilateral romantic marriage model, America can meet its requirement on the trilateral relations. Just like Kissinger has ever said: “Our relations with potential adversaries should be like this, our freedom of choice to both of them is always more than that between themselves”. ¹¹ Since the end of the Cold War, America has been moving in this direction, all specific policies also should be developed with the premise of American freedom of activity.

America achieves its own strategic purposes primarily through three roles.

American roles in the trilateral relations almost can be felt in every aspect. The above elaborated three roles work simultaneously at times. Herein are two typical cases selected to elaborate how America roles work.

First example is America’s role in the issue of historical dispute between China and Japan. The conflict on historical understanding composes the main theme of Sino-Japan relations in Koizumi’s office term. The continually intensified conflict made the pattern of “cold politics but hot economy” between the two countries gradually turned to “cold politics and cold economy”, which may also impact American further interest. There are also historical disputes between America and Japan, Japan’s behavior of history denial will touch upon America sooner or later. For this reason, America took a part quietly as the conflict between China and Japan flaring up, the Bush administration tried to tackle it with the principles of “non-interference, taking partial position, keeping the bottom line, promoting the interests”.

Firstly, the US generally takes a neutral and non-interfered standpoint. America’s official remarks often tried to avoid touching the history issue, or made an implicit and evasive statements when forced to say something.

Secondly, the US tries to control the extent of intensity of the conflict. This was reflected in: (1) openly declared that America hopes the two improve their relations. In November 8, 2005, when Bush made his first comment on the Yasukuni Shrine issue, he said: “it seems like a proper role for me is to remind our friends in the region that it takes work to overcome the past. But overcoming the past is going to be necessary to have a bright future.” ²⁵ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also said: “We encourage the Sino-Japanese friendship.” ²⁶ But when Japan crossed the redline to deny its history of invasion of neighbors, the US openly criticizes Japan. When Japanese Prime Minister Abe challenged the definition of “aggression” in his reply to parliament questioning, the Washington Post Editorial openly criticizes Abe’s historical revisionism and showed moral support for China and Korea which had been invaded by Japan. ²⁷ (2) Put pressure on China openly and on Japan privately. America took dual tactics to respectively deal with China and Japan. In the public statement they demanded that China takes the initiative to make more concessions. When talking about the Yasukuni issue in China–US summit, Bush’s response was “urged China to promote the future-oriented dialogue with Japan.” ²⁸ But behind the scenes they secretly put pressure on Japan on high-level bilateral talks. Bush asked Koizumi in Japan–US summit held in late 2005: “China will be East Asia’s largest player in the future, how do you think of it?” ²⁹ In June 2006 when Koizumi visited America, Bush asked him straightly to the point: “what about the relations with China?”. ³⁰

Thirdly, America took the opportunity to encourage Japan to play a more active role in Asia. Tension of the Sino-Japan relations in the new century provided America a good opportunity to accelerate its pace of implementing strategic vision towards Japan. The Bush administration not only reinforced the US–Japan alliance once again, but also repeatedly declared that Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution was outdated. The US aimed to allow Japan to play a larger role in the Asia–Pacific region and share more responsibilities in global issues. The tension in Sino-Japan tension over historical issues relations rooted from the historical legacies provides more leverage for America to put pressure on Japan to move towards US expectation. On such issues as US military base adjustment, Extension of Japanese Self Defense Forces Functions, Adding Taiwan Strait situation as a concerned issue to the amended US–Japan Security Treaty, the US had successfully pressured the Koizumi government to withstand domestic pressure and accept America’s arrangement by exploiting the tension in Sino-Japanese relations.

As China’s power is growing at dramatic paces, the fundamental goal for the US is to make sure the balance of power will not tilt in favor of China, particularly when it is certain about whether this power will be a friendly one or hostile one. Therefore, Sino-Japanese disputes on history (Japan’s invasion of its Asian neighbors) have been rather an instrument for the US to manipulate rather than a problem itself. History issue serves for the US to pressure on Japan as well as on China as US can righteously serve as a moral arbitrator because of the US’s role as China’s ally and as the occupier on Japan in WWII.

Another typical example is America’s response to the centrifugal behavior of Hatoyama administration. Hatoyama’s diplomacy with America and China started out at the same time. No evidence showed that he tried to take advantage of one bilateral relation by manipulating the other at the beginning. It was only after his new diplomacy encountered significant resistance from the US side while received positive assessment from Chinese side, did Hatoyama begin to consider balancing the US pressure by relying good relations with China. Diet affairs chief of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan Kenji Yamaoka said: “Japan–US ties are strained. It is a realistic approach to first strengthen Japan–China ties and then resolve the problems with the United States,” He also said, Ichiro Ozawa, the Secretary General of the DPJ, and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed during a meeting in Beijing that trilateral relations should be equally balanced like an equilateral triangle. ³¹ Hatoyama himself also stressed to media on March 19, 2010 that “If Japan–China relations can be improved, and then both the Japan–US and China–US relations will improve.” ³² This remark resembled similar logic with the well-known Koizumi’s statement. ³³ But ironically the leverages and goals in the similar logic are opposite. Naturally this aroused strong resentment from America. The New York Times reported that the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Campbell, complained to the Japanese Diet Defense Secretary in October 2009 that; “Hatoyama told the leaders of Chinese and South Korean leaders that Japan’s overdependence on the US may trigger a crisis in the U.S.-Japan relations.” “What would Japan have felt if American government openly said it value China more than Japan?” ³⁴ Campbell showed his concern openly about the visit of a large Japanese delegation to Beijing headed by Ichiro Ozawa in 2009. He questioned the visiting director of policy investigating committee of Japanese People’s New Party: “Does Hatoyama administration want to keep distance with America so as to enhance its relations with China?”. ³⁵

However, the hint didn’t seem to alert the Japanese government. When Hatoyama and Hu Jintao met in America in September 2009, he proposed the concept of the “East Asian Community”, hoping that Asia establishes a Community like EU to speak out with one voice. He repeated this suggestion afterwards. Japan’s foreign ministry Okada even said that this community does not include America. Hatoyama also raised a concept of “close and equal Japan–US Alliance”, which may be regarded as a challenge to the traditional alliance concept; And a more serious problem is Hatoyama’s ambiguous attitude on the issue of US bases transfer in Okinawa.

Hatoyama administration’s substantial adjustment of Japan’s role in the trilateral relationship had moved beyond what America could tolerate. As a result, America took punitive steps in response to Japan’s “betrayal” behavior. On September 13, 2009, during the time of attending the UN General Assembly, Obama talked with Chinese President Hu Jintao for one and a half hours, but only gave 25 min to Hatoyama for their first meeting after the latter took office, which broke the shortest record of Japan–US Summit talks in history. Subsequently president Obama gave direct telephone calls to leaders of allies, China and India to explain his new strategy in Afghanistan in advance, but just neglected Prime Minister Hatoyama. Then, America intransigently insisted that there was no room for re-negotiating about the Futenma base issue and rejected Japanese request. Defense Secretary Robert Gates even declined to meet his Japanese counterpart when he visited Japan. Under American great pressure, Hatoyama had to resign.

America showed its deliberation on this issue. It didn’t expect Japan to get too close with China, in particular disliked Japanese attempt to exclude American influence in East Asia. So the US government chose Japan as a target to crack down to demonstrate its resolution to maintain its leadership in the region. American found if it kept the external pressure at an appropriate level it could on the one hand would not over-stimulate the Japanese people’s nationalism; on the other hand, it would stir up the sense of urgency among those Japanese who support a strong US–Japan alliance. The latter would mobilize the former and push the Japanese government from within to strengthen the alliance. Hence at one hand, America made explicit and strong reaction to some top officials who gave inappropriate remarks on US–Japan relations; meanwhile, they showed patience and lenience to the new Japanese government and stressed on the importance of the alliance. Assistant Secretary of State Campbell, publicly stated that Japan is an “equal partner” and that the US has “patience, a commitment to listen, and to work closely” with the new government in Tokyo. ³⁶ The US resorted to both pressure and appeasement simultaneously to address on Japanese attempt to adopt the equilateral diplomacy between China and America. One Foreign Policy article commented: Hatoyama’s Successors “will well judge, following the Hatoyama fiasco, that the domestic politics of picking fights with America are fraught—and that the powers of the prime minister’s office should therefore be directed toward other issue areas. Such an accomplishment manifestly would be in America’s interest.” ³⁷ Exactly as the Foreign Policy predicted, when Naoto Kan took office, he fully learned the predecessor’s lesson, never again referred to the new concept of “East Asian Community”, “Close-And-Equal Diplomacy” and “Japan, America and China should compose to an equilateral triangle”. While answering reporters’ questions after he became prime minister, Kan said that “the axis of Japanese diplomacy is the Japan–US relations. We should pay attention to the relations with China on the basis of maintaining a trust relationship with America. This is the right direction of Japan’s future.” ³⁸

Based on the such factors as the prolonged, persistent and controversial historical legacy between China and Japan (It’s always difficult for Asian countries to resolve the regional disputes on their own), the power structure (They are equal to each other but both are far inferior to that of the US), the identity (both China and Japan regard the US as friend and both aim to maintain friendly relations with the latter.), the US was entrusted as an actual “strategic balancer” and “arbitrator” in East Asia. Meanwhile, there are no regional security institutions like NATO in Asia, America is still taking the role of committing to regional security and order as it did during the Cold War period. ³⁹ Whether the two powers can put aside their differences to follow the path toward a prosperous, stable, and successful East Asia, or whether the region is torn apart by destructive competition and tension due to military build-ups, will partly depend on how America handles the situation. ⁴⁰

From a subjective point of view, among the three countries, it is America who is most motivated to maintain the status quo, because it is the biggest beneficiary from current system; China can accept the status quo too, because its economic boom benefits from the current regional arrangement. Moreover, it cannot narrow the gap with America in terms of national power in the short term; Japan is the most reluctant one to keep the status quo in which the United States maintains a strong power while China grows into a stronger power while leaving Japan inevitably dwindling into a weaker power in the region. The risk is that while Japan is anxious about its loss of comparative power against China, its attempt to change the status quo will challenge US’s role as an off-shore balancer. The ongoing China Japan dispute over Diaoyu Island proved that it is a dangerous game for the US to take positions between the two competing regional powers. ⁴¹

However, from the strategic perspective, Japan has to accept it due to incapability to change the situation and respective dependence on America and China in the field of security and economy. Therefore, maintaining the status quo is the “least common interest” among the three powers. Considering that Japan unexceptionally tries to involve America in almost all its disputes with China, while China also expects America to maintain its traditional role on Japan as a safety valve to keep Japan from revising its multilateralism, the current roles of America in East Asia will continue to function in the trilateral relations.

By far, America’s efforts to keep its own role in East Asia have been modestly successful. In the near future, as America will remain the world’s sole superpower, the hope for the complete reconciliation between China and Japan is slim based on their respective growing domestic nationalism. America’s roles in the trilateral relations will not see dramatic changes. The key in the future is whether the US can effectively balance its relations with China and Japan with appropriate means. Because first of all, anyone among the three will try its best to raise its position (to struggle for the hub), which means America will often face the challenge of being pushed off the position of hub; Secondly, as the hub America should evade to make any power at the wing position feel that the hub and the other wing are cooperating to weaken itself. If so the third player will likely chose to pay a higher price to end the trilateral romantic marriage pattern. Therefore, in order to maintain the most favorable structure, even players like America has to act very carefully with both skills and power. After all, this will be a delicate game.

Will a “menage a trois” pattern reemerge?

While it is unforeseeable for such a pattern of triangular relations to emerge in the near future, it is a positive way to construct the relations towards that direction as this pattern is more stable and more fitting the trend of international interdependence and win- win approach. The mutually friendly triangular relationship among them will not necessarily lead to the US, who processes the pivot position, to lose its strategic advantage. Instead, the positive relations will reduce the transaction cost for the “leader” to maintain a stable relationship and allow the US more strategic resources to manipulate as a global superpower. However, political trust has to be built to sustain such a relationship. Institutions have to be set up or reformed in order to achieve this goal.