Abstract
This article demonstrates the explanatory power of an expanded policy stream, as part of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework. Product substitutes, corporate social responsibility, the global economy, and the market maverick rationalize the incentives under which regulators, consumers, businesses, and environmental NGOs interact to explain the formation of two landmark voluntary programs on mercury and arsenic use, respectively. Arsenic and mercury are ranked first and third, respectively, on the US Environmental Protection Agency’s priority list of hazardous substances. In both cases, the existence of a product substitute that performed on par with the original product but generated less negative environmental impact motivated the private sector to go beyond compliance in their environmental management. Notwithstanding, the push and pull of variables in the problem, politics, and policy streams, and the interplay of diverse actors led to the emergence of diverse forms of voluntary programs. In the mercury case, an industry association steered the technocratic process of the chlor-alkali industry’s voluntary stewardship program, which led to marginal reductions in toxic chemical use, as part of the global phase-out of mercury already under way. By contrast, in the arsenic case, an environmental activist campaign successfully compelled the pressure-treated wood industry to concede to a voluntary cancelation of chromated copper arsenate, an arsenic compound, in residential uses. Subsequently, arsenic use fell to levels not seen since the 1920s. In both cases, strong coalition building—the former by businesses and the latter by environmental NGOs—combined with a fragmented or nonexistent opposing side shaped the final form of each voluntary program.
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Notes
Alternative and nonregulatory governance approaches include information-based regulations (e.g., EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory), collaborative partnerships (e.g., regional watershed partnerships), market-based approaches (e.g., SO2 trading, catch shares in fisheries), and voluntary programs (e.g., EPA’s 33/50 program, the Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care). This paper is primarily concerned with voluntary programs, which encourage firms and industries to engage in beyond-compliance actions without the force of law.
Source: https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/spl/resources/ATSDR_2017_Full_SPL_Spreadsheet.xlsx. Lead, which is ranked second on the priority list, is not a part of this study because lead has not been a subject of a voluntary agreement negotiated between the government and private industry.
The ACF answers questions about how people mobilize, maintain, and act in advocacy coalitions, how people learn, and how scientists and technical information are incorporated into the policy process (Weible and Ingold 2018; Weible et al. 2009). On the other hand, Punctuated Equilibrium theory explains the observation that political processes are generally characterized by stability and incrementalism, but occasionally they produce dramatic departures from the past (Baumgartner et al. 2018; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Baumgartner et al. 2009). Furthermore, Social Construction theory emphasizes the ways in which policy problems and target populations are socially constructed to explain why some groups are advantaged more than others and how policy designs reinforce or alter such advantages (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Schneider and Sidney 2009).
This paper follows Zahariadis (2007) to posit that stream independence is a conceptual devise rather an assumption about empirical reality. It has the advantage of enabling researchers to uncover rather than assume rationality, i.e., it allows for the fact that sometimes policies are in search of a rationale or they solve no problems.
These incentives could come from the politics stream as corporate actors engage in voluntary compliance to avoid being the targets of private and public politics (see “Politics stream”).
This discussion pertains to the supply side of the global economy. The demand side is the rising consumer demand for “green” products in market competition.
Interview protocol is available upon request from the author.
In an interview, the former director of the Chlorine Institute said that it was difficult to measure emissions from a process he described as “‘football field-sized’ lines of 30 to 50 mercury-cells, each holding 10,000 pounds of mercury (Johnson 1999).”
Interview quote by an environmental manager of a mercury-cell plant.
Interview quote by EPA Regional 5 office staff scientist #1.
The characterization of an “improved” relationship was expressed by the former director of the Chlorine Institute, a Chlorine Institute member firm representative, and two EPA regulators during interviews.
Interview quote by EPA Regional 5 office staff scientist #3.
This characterization of the relationship between industry, regulators, and NGO activists were expressed widely by NGO informants who regularly participated in GLBTS stakeholder meetings.
This information was shared with the author by the former director of the Chlorine Institute and by staff scientist #3 at the EPA Regional 5 office, as well as confirmed on the EPA website.
Industry news wires reported about the chlor-alkali industry’s voluntary reductions as an act of CSR. See “Olin to end Hg releases from chlor-alkali plants,” April 29, 1999, Chemical & Engineering News.
Interview quote by a former CPSC senior administrator.
Ibid.
Interview quote by a staff scientist at the EPA’s Office of Pesticide Program.
The largest arsenic end-user was the pressure-treated wood industry (88%), agriculture (4%), glass (4%), and semiconductor (4%) industries (“USGS Minerals Information” 2012).
In 2002, EPA awarded the “Designing Greener Chemicals Award” to the manufacturer of ACQ (see https://www.epa.gov/greenchemistry/presidential-green-chemistry-challenge-2002-designing-greener-chemicals-award). This information was also independently shared with the author by (1) independent consultant who conducted an independent assessment of ACQ, (2) coordinator of the NGO activist campaign, and (3) staff scientist at the EPA Office of Pesticide Program’s Antimicrobials Division.
Information shared by a NGO activist in an interview.
Interview quote by the president of the wood treatment company that switched to ACQ.
The president of the wood treatment company claimed that his company did not receive discounts on ACQ from the chemical manufacturer before or after his company’s switch to ACQ.
Interview quote by a University of Miami professor who served as an expert scientist in the SAP.
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Hsueh, L. Expanding the multiple streams framework to explain the formation of diverse voluntary programs: evidence from US toxic chemical use policy. J Environ Stud Sci 10, 111–123 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00600-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00600-1