Journal of Cryptographic Engineering

, Volume 3, Issue 3, pp 157–167 | Cite as

Formal verification of a CRT-RSA implementation against fault attacks

  • Maria Christofi
  • Boutheina Chetali
  • Louis  Goubin
  • David Vigilant
Special Section on PROOFS workshop

Abstract

Cryptosystems are highly sensitive to physical attacks, which lead security developers to design more and more complex countermeasures. Nonetheless, no proof of flaw absence has been given for any implementation of these countermeasures. This paper aims to formally verify an implementation of one published countermeasure against fault injection attacks. More precisely, the formal verification concerns Vigilant’s CRT-RSA countermeasure which is designed to sufficiently protect CRT-RSA implementations against fault attacks. The goal is to formally verify whether any possible fault injection threatening the pseudo-code is detected by the countermeasure according to a predefined attack model.

Keywords

Fault attacks Frama-C Countermeasures Cryptographic implementation Formal verification RSA-CRT 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Pascal Paillier for his useful contribution to this work.

References

  1. 1.
  2. 2.
    Aizatulin, M., Dupressoir, F., Gordon, A.D., Jürjens, J.: Verifying cryptographic code in C: some experience and the Csec challenge. In: Formal Aspects of Security and Trust—8th International Workshop, FAST 2011, Leuven, Belgium, September 12–14, 2011. Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7140, pp. 1–20. Springer (2012)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Aumüller, C., Bier, P., Fischer, W., Hofreiter, P., Seifert, J.P.: Fault attacks on RSA with CRT: concrete results and practical countermeasures. In: CHES. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2523, pp. 260–275. Springer (2003)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bar-El, H., Choukri, H., Naccache, D., Tunstall, M., Whelan, C.: The sorcerer’s apprentice guide to fault attacks. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 2004, 100 (2004) Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Berthomé, P., Heydemann, K., Kauffmann-Tourkestansky, X., Lalande, J.F.: Attack model for verification of interval security properties for smart card C codes. In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security, PLAS ’10, pp. 2:1–2:12. ACM, New York (2010). doi: 10.1145/1814217.1814219
  6. 6.
    Berthomé, P., Heydemann, K., Kauffmann- Tourkestansky, X., Lalande, J.F.: Simulating physical attacks in smart card C codes: the jump attack case. In: e-Smart (2011)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Boneh, D., DeMillo, R.A., Lipton, R.J.: On the importance of eliminating errors in cryptographic computations. J. Cryptol. 14(2), 101–119 (2001)MathSciNetMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Boscher, A., Naciri, R., Prouff, E.: CRT RSA algorithm protected against fault attacks. In: WISTP. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4462, pp. 229–243. Springer, Heraklion (2007)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Butelle, F., Hivert, F., Mayero, M., Toumazet, F.: Formal proof of SCHUR conjugate function. In: AISC/MKM/Calculemus. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6167, pp. 158–171. Springer, Berlin (2010)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Chen, H., Dean, D., Wagner, D.: Model checking one million lines of C code. In: NDSS. The Internet Society (2004)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Coron, J.S., Giraud, C., Morin, N., Piret, G., Vigilant, D.: Fault attacks and countermeasures on vigilant’s RSA-CRT algorithm. In: FDTC, pp. 89–96. IEEE Computer Society (2010)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Coron, J.S., Naccache, D., Tibouchi, M.: Fault attacks against emv signatures. In: CT-RSA. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5985, pp. 208–220. Springer, San Francisco (2010)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Duprat, S., Gaufillet, P., Lamiel, V.M., Passarello, F.: Formal verification of SAM state machine implementation. In: Embedded Real Time Software and Systems (ERTS’10) (2010)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
  15. 15.
    Giraud, C.: An RSA implementation resistant to fault attacks and to simple power analysis. IEEE Trans. Comput. 55(9), 1116–1120 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Hoare, C.A.R.: An axiomatic basis for computer programming (reprint). Commun. ACM 26(1), 53–56 (1983)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
  18. 18.
    Kupferman, O., Vardi, M.Y.: Model checking of safety properties. Formal Methods Syst. Des. 19(3), 291–314 (2001)MathSciNetMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Lenstra, A.: Memo on RSA signature generation in the presence of faults (1996). http://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/164524/files.nscan20.PDF
  20. 20.
    Meola, M.L., Walker, D.: Faulty logic: reasoning about fault tolerant programs. In: Programming Languages and Systems, 19th European Symposium on Programming, ESOP 2010, Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2010, Paphos, Cyprus, March 20–28, 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6012, pp. 468–487. Springer, Berlin (2010)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Rivain, M.: Securing RSA against fault analysis by double addition chain exponentiation. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 2009, 165 (2009)Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Shamir, A.: Improved method and apparatus for protecting public key schemes from timing and fault attacks. Patent number WO9852319 (1998)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Vigilant, D.: RSA with CRT: a new cost-effective solution to Thwart fault attacks. In: CHES. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5154, pp. 130–145. Springer, Berlin (2008)Google Scholar
  24. 24.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maria Christofi
    • 1
    • 2
  • Boutheina Chetali
    • 3
  • Louis  Goubin
    • 2
  • David Vigilant
    • 1
  1. 1.GemaltoMeudon sur SeineFrance
  2. 2.Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines UniversityVersailles CedexFrance
  3. 3.Trusted Labs SAS VersaillesFrance

Personalised recommendations