Recyclable PUFs: logically reconfigurable PUFs

  • Stefan Katzenbeisser
  • Ünal Kocabaş
  • Vincent van der Leest
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
  • Geert-Jan Schrijen
  • Christian Wachsmann
Regular Paper
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:

Abstract

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are security primitives that exploit intrinsic random physical variations of hardware components. In the recent years, many security solutions based on PUFs have been proposed, including identification/authentication schemes, key storage and hardware-entangled cryptography. Existing PUF instantiations typically exhibit a static challenge/response behavior, while many practical applications would benefit from reconfigurable PUFs. Examples include the revocation or update of “secrets” in PUF-based key storage or cryptographic primitives based on PUFs. In this paper, we present the concept of logically reconfigurable PUFs (LR-PUFs) that allow changing the challenge/response behavior without physically replacing or modifying the underlying PUF. We present two efficient LR-PUF constructions and evaluate their performance and security. In this context, we introduce a formal security model for LR-PUFs. Finally, we discuss several practical applications of LR-PUFs focusing on lightweight solutions for resource-constrained embedded devices, in particular RFIDs.

Keywords

Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) Logically reconfigurable PUFs Recyclable access tokens 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Katzenbeisser
    • 1
  • Ünal Kocabaş
    • 2
  • Vincent van der Leest
    • 3
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
    • 4
  • Geert-Jan Schrijen
    • 3
  • Christian Wachsmann
    • 2
  1. 1.Security Engineering GroupTechnische Universität Darmstadt (CASED)DarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.System Security LabTechnische Universität Darmstadt (CASED)DarmstadtGermany
  3. 3.Intrinsic-ID B.V.EindhovenThe Netherlands
  4. 4.System Security LabTechnische Universität Darmstadt (CASED) and Fraunhofer SIT DarmstadtDarmstadtGermany

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