Philosophy & Technology

, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp 61–78 | Cite as

Taking Stock of Extension Theory of Technology

Research Article
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:

Abstract

In this paper, I will focus on the extension theories of technology. I will identify four influential positions that have been put forward: (1) technology as an extension of the human organism, (2) technology as an extension of the lived body and the senses, (3) technology as an extension of our intentions and desires, and (4) technology as an extension of our faculties and capabilities. I will describe and critically assess these positions one by one and highlight their advantages and their shortcomings and limitations. Along the way, I will explicate some of the differences and similarities between the various approaches. I conclude the paper with some suggestions for future research directions that will be beneficial for advancing theory building and that will drive forward the philosophical refinement of extension theory.

Keywords

Technology as extension Artifacts Philosophy of technology Human-technology relations Instrumentalism Extended mind Extension theory 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Tanja Hentschel and Felicitas Selter for feedback on earlier drafts, as well as one anonymous reviewer for valuable comments.

References

  1. Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  2. Allen-Hermanson, S. (2012). Superdupersizing the mind: extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat. Philosophical Studies, 158(1), 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bejjanki, V. R., Zhang, R., Li, R., Pouget, A., Green, C. S., Lu, Z.-L., & Bavelier, D. (2014). Action video game play facilitates the development of better perceptual templates. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1417056111.Google Scholar
  4. Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended self in a digital world. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Besmer, K. (2012). Embodying a translation technology: the cochlear implant and cyborg intentionality. Techné, 16(3), 296–316.Google Scholar
  6. Boden, M. (2006). Mind as machine. A history of cognitive science. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Bosco, R., & Wilson, D. E. (Eds.). (2007). Collected works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vol. 7: society and solitude. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Brey, P. (2000). Technology as extension of human faculties. In C. Mitcham (Ed.), Metaphysics, epistemology, and technology. Research in philosophy and technology (pp. 59–78). London: Elsevier.Google Scholar
  9. Carr, N. G. (2011). The shallows: what the Internet is doing to our brains. New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
  10. Clark, A. (2007). Re-inventing ourselves: the plasticity of embodiment, sensing, and mind. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 32(3), 263–282.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. De Preester, H. (2011). Technology and the body: the (im)possibilities of re-embodiment. Foundations of Science, 16(2), 119–137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. De Preester, H., & Tsakiris, M. (2009). Body-extension versus body-incorporation: is there a need for a body-model? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(3), 307–319.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Dreyfus, H. (2002). Intelligence without representation—Merleau-Ponty’s critique of mental representation. The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(4), 367–383.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Dreyfus, S. E. (2004). The five-stage model of adult skill acquisition. Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, 24(3), 177–181. doi: 10.1177/0270467604264992.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Feibleman, J. K. (1966). Technology as skills. Technology and Culture, 7(3), 318–328.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Feibleman, J. K. (1967). The philosophy of tools. Social Forces, 45(3), 329–337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Feibleman, J. K. (1979). Technology and human nature. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 10(1), 35–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Granic, I., Lobel, A., & Engels, R. C. M. E. (2014). The benefits of playing video games. American Psychologist, 69(1), 66–78. doi: 10.1037/a0034857.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Heersmink, R. (2012). Defending extension theory: a response to Kiran and Verbeek. Philosophy and Technology, 25(1), 121–128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Heersmink, R. (2014). Dimensions of integration in embedded and extended cognitive systems. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi: 10.1007/s11097-014-9355-1.Google Scholar
  22. Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the lifeworld. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Ihde, D. (2002). Bodies in technology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  24. Ihde, D., & Selinger, E. (2004). Merleau-Ponty and epistemology engines. Human Studies, 27(4), 361–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Kapp, E. (1877). Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Cultur aus neuen Gesichtspunkten. Westermann: Braunschweig.Google Scholar
  26. Kiran, A. H., & Verbeek, P.-P. (2010). Trusting our selves to technology. Knowledge, Technology and Policy, 23(3–4), 409–427.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Lawson, C. (2008). An ontology of technology. Techné, 12(1), 48–64.Google Scholar
  28. Lawson, C. (2010). Technology and the extension of human capabilities. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 40(2), 207–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Leibniz, G. W. (1985). Philosophical essays. Translated and edited by Roger Ariew and Dan Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
  30. McCarthy, J., & Wright, P. (2004). Technology as experience. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  31. McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding media: the extensions of man. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
  32. Menary, R. (2006). Attacking the bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 19(3), 329–344.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2003). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, trans.). London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  34. Mitcham, C. (1994). Thinking through technology. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
  35. Neely, E. L. (2013). Machines and the moral community. Philosophy & Technology, 27(1), 97–111. doi: 10.1007/s13347-013-0114-y.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Putnam, H. (1973). Psychological predicates. In D. D. Capitan & W. H. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind, and religion (pp. 37–49). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
  37. Rothenberg, D. (1995). Hand's end. Technology and the limits of nature. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  38. Van den Eede, Y. (2014). Extending “Extension.”. In A. D. Propen, D. M. Weiss, & C. E. Reid (Eds.), Design, mediation, and the posthuman (pp. 151–171). Lanham: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
  39. Verbeek, P.-P. (2008). Obstetric ultrasound and the technological mediation of morality: a postphenomenological analysis. Human Studies, 31(1), 11–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Wheeler, M. (2010). In defence of extended functionalism. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind (pp. 245–270). MIT Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Research Center for Neurophilosophy and Ethics of NeuroscienceLudwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenMunichGermany

Personalised recommendations