Philosophy & Technology

, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 139–156 | Cite as

Humanist and Nonhumanist Aspects of Technologies as Problem Solving Physical Instruments

  • Sadjad SoltanzadehEmail author
Original Paper


A form of metaphysical humanism in the field of philosophy of technology can be defined as the claim that besides technologies’ physical aspects, purely human attributes are sufficient to conceptualize technologies. Metaphysical nonhumanism, on the other hand, would be the claim that the meanings of the operative words in any acceptable conception of technologies refer to the states of affairs or events which are in a way or another shaped by technologies. In this paper, I focus on the conception of technologies as problem-solving physical instruments in order to study the debate between the humanist and the nonhumanist ways of understanding technologies. I argue that this conception commits us to a hybrid understanding of technologies, one which is partly humanist and partly nonhumanist.


Humanism Nonhumanism Metaphysics of technology Problem-solving Extended mind thesis 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE)Charles Sturt UniversityCanberraAustralia

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