Philosophy & Technology

, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 95–114 | Cite as

Why Theories of Causality Need Production: an Information Transmission Account

Research Article

Abstract

In this paper, I examine the comparatively neglected intuition of production regarding causality. I begin by examining the weaknesses of current production accounts of causality. I then distinguish between giving a good production account of causality and a good account of production. I argue that an account of production is needed to make sense of vital practices in causal inference. Finally, I offer an information transmission account of production based on John Collier’s work that solves the primary weaknesses of current production accounts: applicability and absences.

Keywords

Causality Production Causal inference Information Absences Collier 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for funding this work on mechanisms. I am also grateful to numerous colleagues and two anonymous referees for extensive discussions leading to improvement of the work. These colleagues include, but are not limited to: John Collier, Luciano Floridi, James Ladyman, Bert Leuridan, Federica Russo, Erik Weber and Jon Williamson. Remaining errors are, of course, my own.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of KentCanterburyUK

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