Abstract
The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a classic non-cooperative game widely studied in terms of its theoretical analysis as well as in its applications, ranging from sociology and biology to economics. In this work, we show that the attractor of the discrete time best-response dynamics of the RPS game is a finite union of periodic orbits. Moreover, we also describe the bifurcations of the attractor and determine the exact number, period and location of the periodic orbits.
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Notes
In fact, the smallest period is \(3\left( \left\lfloor \frac{\log (a/b)}{\log (1-\varepsilon )}\right\rfloor +1\right) \sim \frac{3\log (b/a)}{\varepsilon }\) as \(\varepsilon \rightarrow 0\).
The inverse of the supergolden ratio.
For every \(x\in {\mathbb {R}}\), \(x\le \lfloor x\rfloor <x+1\) and \(x-1<\lceil x \rceil \le x\).
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Acknowledgements
The authors were partially supported by the Project PTDC/MAT-PUR/29126/2017 and by the Project CEMAPRE—UID/MULTI/00491/2019 financed by FCT/MCTES through national funds. The authors also wish to express their gratitude to João Lopes Dias for stimulating conversations.
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Appendix A. Monotonicity Lemmas
Appendix A. Monotonicity Lemmas
Recall that
and that \({\hat{B}}\) is the set of regular strategies in B, i.e. \({\hat{B}}=B\cap {\hat{\Delta }}\).
Lemma A.1
Let \(x\in {\hat{B}}\). If \(n(x)\ge m\), then \(n(P(x))\ge m\).
Proof
We suppose that \(m\ge 2\). Otherwise, there is nothing to prove. Let \(x\in B_k\) for some \(k\ge m\). Then,
Since \(x\in B_k\), we have
Hence,
Therefore, to prove that \(n(P(x))\ge m\), it is sufficient to show that
Notice that
Since \(\lambda ^m< \alpha \) and \(\lambda ^k\le \lambda ^m\), we get
Again, by the definition of m, we have \(\lambda ^{m-1}\ge \alpha \). This shows that \(g(\lambda )>0\) as we wanted to prove. \(\square \)
Lemma A.2
Let \(x\in {\hat{B}}\) such that \(n(P(x))\ge m\). If \(n(P(x))\le n(x)\), then \(n(P^2(x))\le n(P(x))\).
Proof
We want to prove that given \(k\in {\mathbb {N}}\), if \(x\in B_k\) and \(P(x)\in B_j\) for some \(j\le k\), then \(P^2(x)\in B_i\) for some \(i\le j\), for any \(\alpha >0\) and \(\lambda \in (0,1)\) satisfying \(\lambda ^j< \alpha \).
So it is enough to see that
Since \(x\in B_k\),
and \(P(x)\in B_j\) implies that
Because \(S^2(u_\alpha )=(0,2+\alpha ,1-\alpha )\), we have that
But \(u_\alpha \cdot x<\alpha \left( \lambda ^{-1}-1\right) +1\), thus
where
Now, it is easy to see that \(Q_{j,k,\alpha }(\lambda )<b_j\) for every \(\alpha >0\) and \(\lambda \in (0,1)\) satisfying \(\lambda ^j<\alpha \). Indeed,
\(\square \)
Lemma A.3
Let \(x\in {\hat{B}}\) such that \(n(P(x))<m\). If \(n(P(x))\ge n(x)\), then \(n(P^2(x))\ge n(P(x))\).
Proof
The strategy of the proof is the same as that of the previous lemma. We want to prove that given \(k\in {\mathbb {N}}\), if \(x\in B_k\) and \(P(x)\in B_j\) for some \(k\le j<m\), then \(P^2(x)\in B_i\) for some \(i\ge j\), for any \(\alpha >0\) and \(\lambda \in (0,1)\) satisfying \(\lambda ^j\ge \alpha \).
It is enough to see that
As in the proof of the previous lemma, we have that
But \(u_\alpha \cdot x>1\), so
where
Now, it is easy to see that \(Q_{j,k,\alpha }(\lambda )>b_{j-1}\) for every \(\alpha >0\) and \(\lambda \in (0,1)\) satisfying \(\lambda ^j\ge \alpha \). Indeed,
\(\square \)
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Gaivão, J.P., Peixe, T. Periodic Attractor in the Discrete Time Best-Response Dynamics of the Rock-Paper-Scissors Game. Dyn Games Appl 11, 491–511 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00371-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00371-y
Keywords
- Best response dynamics
- Bifurcations
- Discretization
- Fictitious play
- Periodic orbits
- Rock-paper-scissors game