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Dynamic Games and Applications

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 93–116 | Cite as

State-Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games

  • Ilaria Brunetti
  • Yezekael Hayel
  • Eitan AltmanEmail author
Article

Abstract

Standard evolutionary game theory framework is a useful tool to study large interacting systems and to understand the strategic behavior of individuals in such complex systems. Adding an individual state to model local feature of each player in this context allows one to study a wider range of problems in various application areas as networking, biology, etc. In this paper, we introduce such an extension of evolutionary game framework and particularly, we focus on the dynamical aspects of this system. Precisely, we study the coupled dynamics of the policies and the individual states inside a population of interacting individuals. We first define a general model by coupling replicator dynamics and continuous-time Markov decision processes, and we then consider a particular case of a two policies and two states evolutionary game. We first obtain a system of combined dynamics, and we show that the rest points of this system are equilibria profiles of our evolutionary game with individual state dynamics. Second, by assuming two different timescales between states and policies dynamics, we can compute explicitly the equilibria. Then, by transforming our evolutionary game with individual states into a standard evolutionary game, we obtain an equilibrium profile which is equivalent, in terms of occupation measures and expected fitness to the previous one. All our results are illustrated with numerical analysis.

Keywords

Evolutionary game theory Dynamic processes Replicator dynamics Singular perturbation 

List of symbols

\(\mathcal {A}\)

Finite set of pure actions, with \(|\mathcal {A}|=K\)

\(\varDelta :=\{\mathbf {p}\in \mathbb {R}^K_+|\sum _{i\in \mathcal {A}}p_i=1\}\)

Set of strategies

\(\mathcal {S}\)

Set of states, with \(|\mathcal {S}|=N\)

\(\mathcal {U}\)

Set of Markov policies

\(\mathcal {U}_S\)

Set of stationary policies

\(\mathcal {U}_D\)

Set of deterministic policies

\(\mathcal {R}_s(s',a)\)

Transition rate from state \(s'\in \mathcal {S}\) to state \(s\in \mathcal {S}\) given action \(a\in \mathcal {A}\)

\(\pi _s(u_i)\)

Time ratio spent in state s under policy \(u_i\)

\(w_s\)

Fraction of individual in the population in state s; \(\mathbf {w}=(w_1,\ldots ,w_N)\): distribution over all states in the population

\(q_i\)

Fraction of individuals choosing deterministic policy \(u_i\)

\(\xi =(w_1,q_x)\)

Population profile

\(J(s,a;s',a')\)

Immediate fitness that a player get when in state s plays action a in an interaction with an individual in state \(s'\) playing \(a'\)

\(F(\cdot ,\cdot )\)

Fitness of an individual

\(\bar{F}(\cdot )\)

Average expected fitness of a population

\(F_i(\cdot )\)

Expected fitness of an individual choosing deterministic policy \(u_i\in \mathcal {U}_D\)

\(J_i(\cdot )\)

Expected fitness of an individual playing action \(i\in \mathcal {A}\)

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.INRIA Sophia Antipolis and LIA/CERIUniversity of AvignonAvignonFrance
  2. 2.LIA/CERIUniversity of AvignonAvignonFrance
  3. 3.INRIA Sophia Antipolis and LINCS - Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication SciencesValbonneFrance

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